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Here is a rather difficult two-part question: How may we grasp (a) the nature of reality 
and (b) the nature of value? As I understand the man, answering this question was the 
principal, overarching aim of Franz Brentano’s philosophical work. More specifically, he 
wanted to provide an answer that respected a self-imposed theoretical constraint, 
namely, that our grasp of a thing’s status as real or as valuable be ultimately grounded 
in direct encounter with certain aspects of our conscious experience. The purpose of 
my book Brentano’s Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value (henceforth, BPS) is to 
reconstruct Brentano’s attempt to answer his question, present a partial defense of the 
answer, offer some potential improvements on it, and also point to persistent 
difficulties it faces.  
Below, I (a) speed-explain Brentano’s self-imposed constraint and its motivation, 
(b) reconstruct Brentano’s account of the real in light of it, and (c) reconstruct 
Brentano’s corresponding account of the valuable. These three tasks correspond 
roughly to BPS’s three parts: ‘Mind,’ ‘Being,’ and ‘Value.’ 
ge 
One might hope to answer the how-may-we-grasp question by offering definitions of 
such predicates as ‘is real’ and ‘is valuable.’ For Brentano, the problem with this is that 
such definitions would analyze the notions of reality and value in terms of some other 
notions, but unless we already grasp those other notions, the analysis would not help us 
grasp the notions of reality and value. We may of course proceed to offer definitions of 
the notions in terms of which we defined ‘real’ and ‘valuable,’ but the problem would 
recur for those definitions. Ultimately, thinks Brentano, the nature of some phenomena 
must be grasped not through definitions, but somehow directly. Direct grasp of those 
phenomena could then ground (via a web of definitions/analyses) grasp of all other 
notions. 
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 If we enjoyed direct encounter with abstract essences in something like rational 
intuition, we could hope to directly intuit the essence of realness and the essence of 
value. But Brentano denies that there are such abstract entities as Reality-as such and 
Value-as-such. He also denies that sensory perception affords us any direct grasp of its 
objects, for fairly traditional empiricist reasons: who knows what (e.g.) yellow is really 
like in and of itself, independently of its appearance to us? Fortunately, though, there is 
one mental capacity that does grant us direct grasp of its objects, namely, our ‘inner 
perception’ of our ongoing conscious experiences as we live through them.  
Why and how inner perception affords direct grasp of its objects is a complex 
matter (see BPS Ch.1 for detail). But what all this leads to is the following requirement: 
if we are to grasp what it is to be real and what it is to be valuable, there must be some 
experiential phenomena that (i) can be directly grasped in inner perception and (ii) can 
be used to analyze what it is to be real/valuable. This is Brentano’s aforementioned self-
imposed constraint: the nature of the real and the valuable must be appreciated by 
analysis into inner-perceptible experiential elements. No genuine philosophical 
illumination of realness and value can be achieved otherwise. 
ge 
Obviously, much of what is real is outside of our mind. Flowers are real, for instance, 
but we cannot hope to directly grasp them in inner perception. How may we 
nonetheless grasp their reality? Brentano’s basic strategy is to seek a specific type of 
conscious experience that it is appropriate or fitting to have just toward the real. By 
directly grasping the nature of this type of experience, and by analyzing the nature of 
the relevant appropriateness or fittingness in terms of something which is likewise 
directly graspable, we would then be in a position to grasp the nature of the real. 
 Brentano identifies the right kind of experience as what he calls 
‘acknowledgement’ (Anerkennung). In Ch.4 of BPS, I propose to construe 
acknowledgement as the conscious act of believing-in. A typical adult’s acceptance of 
the existence of flowers is tacit and unconscious. But it is also possible to bring up to 
consciousness the question of whether flowers exist and mentally answer in the 
positive. This conscious exercise is essentially the performance of a conscious act of 
believing in flowers. For reasons I belabor in the relevant chapter, it is important to 
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Brentano that believing-in be a sui generis non-propositional state, such that belief in x 
is not analyzable in terms of belief that x exists.  
 The distinctive character of consciously believing in something can be directly 
grasped, according to Brentano, when we contrast it with experiences of disbelieving in 
something and of entertaining something. Juxtaposing the experiences of consciously 
believing-in, disbelieving-in, and entertaining brings into inner-perceptual relief, so to 
speak, the distinctive nature of belief-in. When we do so, we notice that what 
characterizes belief-in is an inbuilt commitment to its object’s existence (in contrast with 
disbelief-in, which carries an inbuilt commitment to nonexistence, and entertaining, 
which is ‘existentially silent’). By ‘inbuilt commitment to existence,’ I mean commitment 
that need not be explicitly specified in the belief-in’s content, because it is ‘baked into’ 
the very act of believing-in. As I put it in the book, ‘acknowledgement’ of x does not 
represent x as existent, but rather represents-as-existent x. Representing-as-existent is 
the very nature of belief-in. (Note well: in saying that belief-in is characterized by ‘inbuilt 
commitment to existence,’ I do not mean that we should define belief-in in terms of 
such notions as existence and commitment. The idea is rather that such expressions 
help fix the mind on the experiential characteristic that distinguishes belief-in from 
disbelief-in, entertaining, and all other types of conscious act.)  
 The real is not, of course, simply that which we believe in. It is that which it is 
right, or fitting, to believe in. So what we must grasp next is the nature of fittingness. 
Here Brentano’s strategy proceeds in two steps (see BPS Ch.5). First, there is a kind of 
experientially manifest fittingness in the phenomenon of self-evidence (Evidenz). Each 
of us believes in his or her own existence, cogito-style, in a way that feels quite different 
from our belief in flowers: there is a self-evident character that attaches to the former 
but not the other. For Brentano, the distinctive nature of this kind of self-evidence can 
again be grasped directly through inner-perceptual contrast, notably between self-
evident and non-self-evident acts of belief-in. The second step of Brentano’s strategy is 
to analyze fittingness in terms of self-evidence, as follows:  
S’s belief in x is fitting iff: if S could form either a self-evident belief in x or a self-
evident disbelief in x, what S would form is a self-evident belief in x.  
Correspondingly, S’s belief in x is unfittingly just in case if what S would form in the 
same circumstance is a self-evident disbelief in x. 
	 4 
 To summarize, true grasp of what it is for something to be real is reached 
through a combination of conceptual analysis and exercises of contrastive inner 
perception. The real is analyzed as that which it is fitting to believe in, fittingness is 
analyzed in terms of self-evidence, and both belief-in and self-evidence are grasped 
directly in contrastive inner perception. Thus we anchor our ultimate understanding of 
realness in direct inner-perceptual grasp of self-evidence and belief-in. Importantly, this 
is not intended to capture what realness ontologically consists in. For Brentano, 
realness is ontologically primitive – you cannot ‘get underneath’ it. The project is to 
offer a way for us to ‘wrap our mind’ around this ontological primitive.  
ge 
Brentano’s strategy for grasping a thing’s status as valuable has a similar structure. The 
initial insight is that the valuable is that which it is fitting to love (lieben), where ‘love’ is 
understood very widely to cover any form of consciously favoring something. (This is 
quite akin to the modern notion of a ‘pro attitude’ – but construed as a conscious act 
rather than a tacit/standing state.) The next step is to bring the nature of favoring into 
inner-perceptual relief by contrasting conscious acts of favoring x with conscious acts of 
disfavoring x and conscious neutrality with respect to x. As for the fittingness of 
favoring, it is not the same fittingness as that of believing-in, since the latter is 
analyzable in terms of self-evidence, but self-evidence is a characteristic of beliefs, not 
pro attitudes. Still, Brentano claims that there is an analogue of self-evidence in the 
domain of pro attitudes: my preference for joy over sadness, for instance, feels 
manifestly and incontrovertibly fitting in a way my preference for representative 
democracy over constitutional monarchy does not. Curiously, nowhere does Brentano 
give this analogue a name; I call it ‘self-imposingness’ (BPS C.8). By inner-perceptually 
contrasting self-imposing favoring and non-self-imposing favoring, we come to grasp 
directly the nature of self-imposingness. We can then analyze the fittingness of favoring 
in terms of it:  
S favors x fittingly iff: if S could either self-imposingly favor x or self-imposingly 
disfavor x, what S would do is self-imposingly favor x.  
Thus the valuable submits to ultimate analysis in terms of the notions of favoring and 
self-imposingness, both of which can be directly grasped through appropriate exercises 
of contrastive inner perception. Here too, it is not part of Brentano’s view that being 
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valuable ontologically consists in being hypothetically self-imposingly favored. He only 
aims to offer a way to ‘get in cognitive touch’ with a thing’s status as valuable.  
 Brentano’s accounts of the real and the valuable are not supposed to be neutral 
on what we should say is real and is valuable. On the contrary, they pave the way to 
substantive ontological and ethical doctrines. In particular, Brentano argues for am 
austere nominalistic ontology according to which ours is a world of massively coincident 
concrete particulars (see BPS Ch.6); and for a specific form of pluralistic 
consequentialism according to which a thing’s value is a function of its promoting the 
occurrence of four intrinsic goods (pleasure, knowledge, fitting attitudes, and 
experience) and demoting the occurrence of three intrinsic evils (pain, ignorance, and 
unfitting attitudes) (see BPS Ch.9). 
 The result is an intellectual edifice that tells us both what is real and what we are 
truly saying when we say that something is real, as well as what is good and what we 
are truly saying when we say that something is good. It is this intellectual edifice that I 
refer to as Brentano’s philosophical system, as it combines both a theoretical 
philosophy that attempts to illuminate the ultimate nature of reality and a practical 
philosophy that ventures to tell us how to live. Intriguingly, it is a system that assigns a 
foundational role to the philosophy of consciousness, insofar as true appreciation of 
realness and value is based ineluctably on direct grasp of conscious phenomena. No 
philosophical understanding of reality and value can be attained, for Brentano, that 
does not pass through direct inner awareness of one’s own lived conscious experience.  
